My way or the riot way: (Markov) Equilibrium in almost-Rubinstein Bargaining with Costly Deferral

Daniel Luo, Northwestern University -- This paper studies “two-stage” perfect information dynamic bargaining. In the first stage, players cannot split surplus, but only agree whether or not to proceed to the second stage, where canonical Rubinstein bargaining occurs. Bargaining power is realized both through an exogenously evolving state variable and an endogenous choice of one player (the activist) to destroy some share of the other player’s (the government) surplus in a costly fashion. This second-order framework formalizes the intuition offered by activists during interviews that rioting is a justified response to repeated state ignorance of their movements and demands as a way to force engagement and secure a “seat at the table.”


Loss Aversion in Dictator Games

Anthony Khaiat, Camille Burton, Gabe Moos, and Kimberly Stafford, University of Chicago -- Dictator Games consist of two players, an allocator and a recipient, in which the allocator governs the distribution of an endowment between themselves and the recipient. Widely replicated Dictator Game studies by Kahneman et al. (1986) and Kuang et al. (2006), among others, reveal that altruistic behavior among allocators can be influenced by variables that regulate models of human inequity aversion. This study presents a randomized, modified Dictator Game experiment with loss aversion and transparency manipulations.


Efficient Matchings on 7 Cups

Eric Gao, Stanford University -- We analyze two-sided asymmetric matching markets on 7 Cups, a site for social-emotional support where users in need of help can request to be matched with volunteer listeners who have the sole power to accept requests. The aim of this paper is to analyze user incentives to characterize what their dominant strategies are when deciding what to reveal when requesting a conversation.

Announcements, Health Economics, Politics, Uncategorized

Our Winter 2023 Issue

On behalf of the Stanford Economic Review Editorial Board, I am pleased to present the eleventh volume, winter issue, of Stanford University’s undergraduate economics journal. Building on our momentum from last year, our publication has continued expanding its global reach over the course of the 2022-2023 academic year. As our readership climbs to new heights,… Continue reading Our Winter 2023 Issue


Saving Our Salmon: Understanding the Environmental Justifications for the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund from an Economic Perspective

Rosie Albenice, University of Georgia -- This paper aims to understand the adversity faced by coho salmon and the ways government intervention can help maintain their population. The Oregon coast coho Evolutionary Significance Unit (ESU) consists of 21 independent salmon populations and 35 dependent populations, which have been receiving restoration treatment through the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund since 2000. The following paper’s observations are derived from 2000 to 2014 data focused on the 21 independent populations within the Oregon coast coho ESU.


Beating Medicare: How a Developing Nation Manages to Provide a Free-For-All Health Care System

By Jirapat Taechajongjintana. Stanford University.  “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person,” states Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHR). Many nations have developed universal healthcare programs in the spirit of Article 3. In many high-income nations such as Sweden and Norway, universal health coverage systems have been… Continue reading Beating Medicare: How a Developing Nation Manages to Provide a Free-For-All Health Care System